First movers, late shakers : between innovation, uncertainty and skepticism in Norway’s market by Nucera, Mark
NORGES HANDELSHØYSKOLE Bergen, Fall 2011 
 
 
Master Thesis within the main profile of International Business 
 
 
Thesis Advisor: Professor Rune Lines 
 
 
 
 
 
First Movers, Late Shakers: Between Innovation, Uncertainty and 
 
Skepticism in Norway’s Market 
 
 
 
 
 
By Mark Nucera 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis was written as a part of the master program at NHH. Neither the institution, the 
supervisor, nor the censors are - through the approval of this thesis - responsible for neither 
the theories and methods used, nor results and conclusions drawn in this work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I 
Abstract 
 
 
This analysis discusses and applies the skepticism discourse as a methodology for 
amplifying risk and uncertainty so that researchers can understand in another fashion why 
consumers and institutions make decisions.   
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1.0 Foreword 
 
 I have been repeatedly challenged by my master’s advisor to keep upping the bar with 
every draft and for this I am truly grateful.  In addition to Rune Lines, I give numerous thanks 
to Rolf Brunstad, Aksel Mjos, Kjell Salvanes, Ingeborg Kleppe, Victor Norman, Siri 
Strandenes, Gregory Corcos and Helge Thorbjornsen for their support and counsel over the 
years.   
2.0 Introduction 
 
 
This analysis argues the skepticism discourse is helpful as a methodology for amplifying 
risk and uncertainty to understand why consumers and institutions make decisions.  In the 
beginning, this thesis will open with a discussion on rational choice theory.   Secondly, this 
analysis will begin with the ways in which first mover advantages have been defined in the last 
few decades, showing the relevant scholarship on order of entry effect and success of firms. 
After showing how late entrants can achieve market dominance through innovation, I will ask 
what innovation entails. I will then look at the relationship between uncertainty, and 
uncertainty writ large, to which I look at various examples of the notion of cultural skepticism 
in Norway, in order to demonstrate the variability and application of socio-cultural consumer 
patterns and attitudes in business practices today.  Then the skepticism discourse will be 
developed as an analytical tool.  I hope to render skepticism a useful paradigm for thinking 
about decisions made within cultures, individuals, and institutions and as a supplement to 
literature on risk and uncertainty. 
Part 1: Homo-Economicus: The Enterprising Man and Rational 
Consumers 
3.1 Rational Economic Theory 
 
 
We know that business is a process of competition for resources.  The individual is but 
one agent in this complex process that involves myriad social networks and structures, like 
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corporations, firms, policies and the government (which participates, regulates, and benefits 
from this process).  This individual is either a consumer of a market, or the corpus that is 
entrepreneurial.  The units of the individual vary depending on the kind of business practice, 
application or research. 
 
For example, for marketers and brand planners, research about consumers as 
individuals proves critical to decisions deployed by corporate strategies. How consumers 
behave is a central question in this literature and we will consider some of the main   
literature coming from this kind of behavioral research in the discussion of first 
 mover advantage. 
 
 
Other scholars, notably economists, have long asked questions about individual’s 
behavior in particular economic contexts, generally along with the supposition that self- 
interest, and desire for wealth create healthy conditions for financial competition, of which 
much can be speculated through advanced mathematical models and other positivistic 
heuristics.  We will look at models in this camp when discussing first movers.  Much of the 
classical economic theories assume the individual to be a Homo-economicus, or Economic 
Man. John Stuart Mill (1836) first gestured towards this understanding of the individual, 
which in later versions is depicted as a rational agent: 
 
"[Political economy] does not treat the whole of man’s nature as modified by the 
social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society. It is concerned with him 
solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging the 
comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end.”1 
 
Influenced by free market advocates like Adam Smith and David Ricardo, who were both 
equally important to classical economic thought, Mill asserted that this man acts in a rational 
utilitarian way with accompanying self-interests to obtain the best possible option, and 
towards happiness. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith reminds us that exchange is not 
for the good of all, but for self-interest.  He writes, “ It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
                                                          
1
 Mill, John Stuart. "On the Definition of Political Economy, and on the Method of Investigation Proper to It," 
London and Westminster Review, October 1836. Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, 
2nd ed. London: Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer, 1874, essay 5, paragraphs 38 and 48. 
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interest."
2
 He acts rationally in so far as he optimizes the possibilities towards a goal, from 
costs-benefits, means to ends, maximizing utility with the eventual goal of profit and 
accumulation. 
 
Drawing on these classical assumptions economists in the 19
th 
century such as Francis 
Edgeworth, William Stanley Jevons, Leon Walrus, and Vilfredo Pareto went on to build 
mathematical models to explain human economic patterns and political economy.  More 
recently, rational choice theory has become the modern avatar for this homo economicus 
theory, which grants rational agents with abilities to make determined decisions and 
judgments based on complete knowledge.  As Lionel Robbins said after evaluating The Great 
Depression, economics is “"the science which studies human behavior as a relationship 
between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses" (Robbins, 1932).  It is no 
wonder that scarcity, with a nod towards means to end, became a central thread of economic 
thought precisely at a time of such poverty. 
 
As a consequence, Malthusianism and Benthamitism complemented these economic 
rationalities with theories of population and poverty control that were then implemented into 
policy. What these policies set up were the familiar Social Darwinist approaches, that included 
ideas about ‘survival of the fittest’ in society, that elites and the most apt and intelligent 
should rule, and that employees should be trained, disciplined and under surveillance. These 
logics get mapped onto corporate structures because they function well, allowing businesses 
to compete in the “dog-eat-dog” free market, with employee policies that manage the work 
force. In today’s diverse economies, where wage-labor is cheap, such as offshore factories and 
assembly lines, these ideologies about the population proved helpful for efficiency. 
 
These were the kinds of question such economists, along with social theorists were 
thinking about, especially as the British encountered their industrial revolution. New 
factories required new labor, which eventually crowded urban spaces, calling for new 
developments in policy and social welfare. These kinds of theories that involve a distinct 
sense of moral existence (i.e., Social Darwinism, Mathusianism) make the individual actions 
and human behavior fit into a logic. These logics can predetermine outcomes and decision- 
                                                          
2
 Smith, Adam. “On the Division of Labour,” The Wealth of Nations, Books I-III. New York: Penguin Classics, 
1986, page 119 
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making processes and practices, creating an appearance that these logics are necessarily 
natural. Looking at these logics that legitimize homo-economicus within rational choice 
theory, for example, as ‘bounded’ can mitigate the extent to which this rational logic is 
challenged or questionable.   Looking to models of uncertainty that move beyond this 
bounded rationality, moreover, can provide helpful tools for assessing the functionality of 
business practices, either for consumer or institutions. Skepticism, as this thesis argues, 
provides a way for rethinking these kinds of processes to understand decision-making. 
Critics of these aforementioned classical and neo-classical economic theories have 
professed that the individual rational agent has at best a “bounded rationality” and that these 
rational models assume a world without variables, risk or uncertainty (Simon 1957).  Some 
have even gone to call rational choice theory absurd because it forgets intrinsic values, like 
morals and ethics (economic nobelist Amartya Sen) or extrinsic values like rewards or 
punishments as examined by Bruno Frey.  Moreover, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
discovered that behaviors are not always consistent with rational economic theory. Their 
studies demonstrated that many agents will act irrationally, leaning toward loss aversion. 
Opponents of homo-economics found voices in the cross-cultural examples provided by 
anthropologists and sociologists such as Marshal Sahlins, Karl Polanyi and Marcel Mauss. 
 
Economic theorists like Frank Knight updated models by looking at uncertainty, and 
the factness of risk (as we will see in more complex terms, through an exploration of first 
movers later on and then again in risk and uncertainty section).  The rational bounded model 
has limits, too, on consumer behavior, especially in response to new trends as seen in 
technology and entertainment.  Critics of this overly rational model also included Veblen and 
Keynes, contesting – along with vastly different analysis – that homo-economicus had been 
previously framed as an actor with too keen a macroeconomic knowledge and decision-
making capacity. This has led to some businesses that maintain positivist assumptions about 
how things will transpire in the market, only to be shamed later, when human or economic 
conditions might shift suddenly, like in recessions or other financial crisis.  
 
These insights lead us to various questions. Might there be legitimate alternatives for 
thinking about business beyond a homo-economicus model? Have cultures such as Norway, 
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constructed their own kind of “bounded rationality”3 that assumes homo a bit more of a 
reciprocating collective, as in homo reciprocan? Might trust, risk and uncertainty be 
formulated in different ways in societies that promote and protect small-scale farms and 
businesses? That societies operate towards conditions of collective harmony demonstrate the 
limits of older economic theories. We have already begun to witness shifts toward 
geopolitical re-orderings of economic capital, along with trends in ethical ‘conscious’ and 
green consumption, rethinking sustainability and economies of scale, along with Corporate 
Socially Responsible Marketing models.  Might today’s business world, market strategies, 
benefit from rethinking these homo-economicus models? How can skepticism give us new 
clues about these other socio-economic contingencies?  Or even more precisely, how can 
skepticism shed new light on decision making? 
 
Before I address more abstract questions, the next section reviews the prevailing 
literature on first mover advantage.  This key concept in business strategy serves as an 
important category to determine success or stature; either for speculating which firms will 
maintain profit share as well as answering questions about the processes by which firms 
outperform their competitors. The following section investigates the ways in which firms are 
considered first movers, how firms maintain or become pioneering and innovative in their 
strategies.  I will then review the literature on Uncertainty and market performance, (from 
barrier-entry to consumer reception) and relate it to historical understandings of skepticism. 
Part 2. First Mover Advantage, Order-of-Entry Effect, and Late Mover 
Innovation 
4.1   First Mover Advantage 
 
 
Empirical and scientific studies about market behavior, which utilize bounded and 
rational models of predicting and speculating business, have long created a language to 
engage patterns and features of business and market behavior, whether technical, strategic, or 
                                                          
3
 Simon, Herbert (1957). "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice", in Models of Man, Social and Rational: 
Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting. New York: Wiley. 
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related to management. These positivist thinkers have analyzed first mover advantage 
repeatedly over the last three decades. The term “first mover” is evident when a firm becomes 
“pioneering” in an industry. “Pioneering” exists when a company creates a new type of 
product or service, makes revolutionary changes in distribution and price, or is the first 
national company to expand into a new international country or specific area.  To use a 
concrete example that will provide a concrete thread throughout this section, Dell Computer 
became pioneering in personal computers due to its solely owned distribution model, which 
eliminated inventory and competition among retailers for its products. This new “low cost 
model” for the PC industry allowed Dell Computer on the surface to achieve number one 
market share within the American PC market, leading to significant first mover advantage in 
countless global markets later on. And this market share and profitability occurred within two 
decades of Dell´s founding. As a result, we can understand superficially that a pioneering firm 
develops a significant competitive advantage compared to both historic and newly formed 
competitors, at least, with respect to its specific product or service available.  It is this 
“pioneering” of processes that leads to eventual first mover status. 
 
Within research and academic literature, it is generally understood that these kind of 
firms will gain a long term competitive advantage, as order of entry and market share have 
been shown to be causally related (Urban and Star 1991). Research has also shown that 
companies consider preemptive strategies to achieve first mover status (Miller, Gartner and 
Wilson 1989). Following Lieberman and Montgomery, the ways firms can achieve first- 
mover status are by (1) producing a new product, (2) using a new process, or (3) entering a 
new market (1989). Kalyanaram, Robinson, and Urban posit: 
 
A market pioneer typically is defined as the first entrant in a new market. Theoretical 
research on first-mover advantage points to potential sources of long-term revenue 
gains for pioneers. For example, a first mover can benefit from risk averse consumers, 
be recognized as the industry standard, and preempt competition with broader product 
lines. (1995:212) 
 
 
 
Notwithstanding the obvious advantages of being the a pioneer, Urban et al and other 
researchers caution that a “head start alone” is not enough to sustain the enduring advantage 
that bequeaths the status of a “first-mover” and reaps higher market shares and profits. 
According to Kerin, Varadarajan and Peterson (1992), “though being the first firm to pursue 
10 
 
an opportunity is a necessary condition for exploiting entry-related advantages, the factors 
involved in achieving and sustaining first-mover advantage are considerably more complex 
than a simple order of entry effect.” This research examines the debates on first-mover 
advantage and order of entry effect, considering the kinds of processes that mediate the 
allegedly causal relationship of entry order and market dominance and share. They conduct a 
critical assessment of the first mover literature, looking towards the sources of first mover 
advantage and “product-market contingencies” that negotiate the order of entry competitive 
relationship. Then, they unpack the moderating effects of various product-market 
contingencies before making implications for marketing practices and future research. 
There are two main threads of work on first mover advantage framed by the authors: 
theoretical-analytical explanation and empirical documentation. Of the theoretical analytical 
camp, we find research coming from economists, on one hand, and a combination of 
behavioral theories that convey possible consumer responses to pioneering and later entry 
brands, on the other hand. 
 
The economic research has focused overwhelmingly on sequential market entry (Lane 
 
1980, Nti and Shubik 1981) theorizing how first movers might gain advantages through entry 
barriers. Von Weizacker’s research defines entry barriers as “a cost of producing which must 
be borne of the firm which seeks to enter the industry but is not borne of other firms already in 
the industry” (1980:400).  Whether the non-pioneer is inside or outside the industry, numerous 
entry barriers are known to contribute to first mover advantage (Demsetz 1982: Karakaya and 
Stahl 1989).  Leadership in technology, the preemption of scarce resources, buyer-switching 
costs, for example, are known entry barriers (Lieberman and Montgomery 
1988; Porter 1985; Rumelt 1987).  Others established theories for entry barriers include 
asymmetric information about risk averse consumers and product quality (Conrad 1983), 
scale and experience effects (Roa and Rutenberg 1979; Smiley and Ravid 1983), reputational 
and communication good effects (Bain 1956; Krouse 1984; Teece 1987).  There has been 
research, moreover, that looks at the differences in marginal effects of advertising between 
first mover and later entrants (Comaner and Wilson 1979). 
 
What some of these analytical and empirical models suggest algorithmically, however, 
are difficult to put into practice. Moreover, the empirical evidence on a broader assessment 
reveals that “market pioneers, early followers and late entrants tend to have different skill 
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and research profiles” (Robinson, Fornell, Sullivan: 1992).   This confirms Abell’s (1978) 
assertion that a ‘strategic window’ can be responsible for a comparative advantage based on 
market evolution, where pioneers need not ‘intrinsically’ be stronger. The ‘strategic 
window’ for market entry, as we will see in later examples of competition, between the 
likes of Apple and Nokia, “opens at different times for different entrant types.” (Abell: 
1978; Robinson, Fornell, Sullivan: 1992)  But Robinson, Fornell, Sullivan caution us to 
consider the ‘strategic window’ as too over simplistic. It is more than just ‘opened’ or 
‘closed’ but hinges on contingencies these authors call ‘specific situation factors’ that range 
from innovation to distribution channels (1992). 
The first mover status is not merely a function of order of entry, or sequence per say, but 
also time. For example, Von Hippel (1984), considers the extra benefits of the lead-time 
during which the firm is first, and also by definition a monopoly, setting the parameters of the 
market, gleaning higher market share and profits along with benefitting from learning curve 
economies, which allow this first firm to retain dominance. But the dominance in the market 
is not only a question of time. Research by Makadok, for example, reminds us that if early 
pricing strategies are considered: 
 
Depending upon a firm’s pricing strategy, any first-mover or early mover advantage 
that firm holds may be manifested in the firm’s ability to command a higher price 
than later entrants, or in its ability to command a larger market share than latter 
entrants, or in some combination of the two. (1998: 685) 
 
The limits of this literature is the overwhelmingly positivist reasoning and emphasis on 
specific individual attributes or effects of first mover advantage and order of entry effect, as 
opposed to investigating the amalgam of attributes and effects in place. Such analytical 
reasoning is counter-productive, because a positivist perspective fails to produce a one-size- 
fits-all paradigm for understanding and explaining first mover advantage and order of entry 
effect. For example, nearly all of the current literature seems to explain attributes and effects 
of first mover advantage and order of entry effect, but some literature seems to emphasize 
first mover as a significant advantage and others as a disadvantage. Why might this be? 
 
Perhaps the lack of entrepreneurial backgrounds by some researchers creates 
confusion on what is and what is not important.  Perhaps a broader perspective in first mover 
advantage and order of entry effect can be introduced.  Being a first mover allows firms to 
crush their competition with respect to marketing spend, fixed production costs, brand equity, 
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research and development, and/or a solid platform for launching new products and services. 
Much of this aforementioned research seems to be focused, instead, on how change in time 
duration of first mover advantage over the last century, or whether first mover advantage is 
more endurable within industrial activity than services. What is more interesting, however, is 
how first mover advantage is overcome by latter entrants and more specifically to this paper, 
how latter entrants might have difficulty in gaining significant international market share in 
specific international markets. Let us consider how later entrants push beyond the defining 
constraints of first mover status. Through innovations in technology and other areas, later 
entrants can still beat the pack, becoming pioneering. For example, Apple has recently 
developed significant market share in smart phones compared to Nokia, the industry bell-
weather in the handset market for more than a decade. 
 
Rarely has the literature attempted to explain the complexity of a company’s success 
over a first mover, such as Apple’s recent ascension compared to Nokia. Perhaps this is due 
to the interdisciplinary nature required to fully understand specific case studies. Was not 
Apple distinctly a brand associated with Western youth culture? And thereby its entrance into 
the smart phone market clearly helped by an established youthful customer base for the 
brand? And according to recent literature that looks at third world consumer economy 
(Garcia-Canclini 2001) does not Western youth culture influence trends globally, both 
outside Western geographies and above the generations in age? Was it, indeed, the 
sophisticated brand planning that targeted a hip coming-of-age adult, as well as the tech 
savvy, a kind of global universal consumer with particular taste? These questions, which 
seem like compelling reason for Apple’s recent and remarkable success beg other, more 
detailed questions about the promise of Apple strategy. 
 
Has the innovations that gave Apple a better edge been a specifically technological 
one? There is no question Apple had superior technology, with its touch screen and software? 
Or is it the superior distribution of the products, with its Apple Stores and Apple syndicated 
stores globally? Or maybe Apple was clever is in developing exclusive distribution 
arrangements with either the number one or number two mobile phone operating network in 
every national market it operates in? How can Apple’s success be positively attributed to 
only one attribute? Or even just a handful of positivist claims? As we will see later, first 
movers are as successful by strategy, as they are by luck and timing. And these 
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contingencies of success or failures are often a brilliant combination of innovation, 
strategy, and happenstance. Apple just began making mobile phones within the last four 
years. Nokia, Research In Motion, and Palm have dominated the smartphone market for 
almost a decade (Chart 1). But according to Chart 2, Apple is now the second largest 
maker of smart phones.  More importantly, between 2006 and 2010, the firm was the only 
new competitor to break into the top 3 globally for smartphone market share.   
 
 
 
Chart 1 
 
 
 
http://www.mobilephonedevelopment.com/archives/
319 
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Chart 2 
 
 
 
http://gadgetizor.com/iphone-surpasses-blackberry-nokia-still-leading/5841/ 
 
 
It is clear that it is advantageous, no doubt, for a firm to have knowledge of a market 
when entering, but that knowledge may come to first mover under trials and risks that carve 
and predict difficulties.   Economists have looked at this relationship between the uncertainty 
faced in being the first, and the subsequent advantages of coming in later.  Apple in some 
ways, as outlined above, benefitted by launching an innovative product to a new market.   
More specifically, both Dell and Apple had not only a receptive domestic market (i.e. the United 
States) but also numerous respective international markets for their products.  Such high and 
sustained international customer response allowed the firms to build a global first mover 
advantage through their knack in cracking various foreign markets.  It is unclear to what degree the 
success of Dell and Apple abroad can be attributed to the type of product categories they offered 
products in.  Obviously, their precise strategies for international market penetration succeeded, but 
more importantly, the product category was almost universally accepted by consumer; 
international consumers were willing to buy American PCs, services, and smartphones.  Could 
economists have predicted Apple’s and Dell’s success through models?   
 
Game theorists, for example, have challenged the competitive advantages of first 
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mover via conditions such as “demand uncertainty” through which firms may strategically be 
a later entrant or first mover, depending on the firm’s reaction curve – either downward or 
upward sloping – which determine strategy as leader or follower (Gal-Or 1985, 
1987; Ghosh and Buchanan 1988; Chaterjee and Sugita 1990). These economic theories, 
however, limit the understanding of product-market contingencies which Kerin, Varadarajan 
and Peterson 1992 argue so critical to assessing first mover advantages.  It is from the optic of 
the consumer, and his association to product or brand, that behavioral theories address the 
advantages of first movers. Peterson (1982), for example, asserts that early adopters and 
innovators of products and brands will confront less resistance among potential customers than 
later entrants, “skimming off” potential customers from those less predisposed to consuming 
new or innovative trends. There exists, also, literature that looks at first movers and consumer 
resistance and lower profits, showing how market pioneers face consumer skepticism when 
confronting new and innovative products (Roger 1983). Moreover, Agarwal and Gort have 
analyzed this process over the course of time, historically, showing that trends in technologies 
and organization  have sped up time spans for innovations within firms considerably: 
 
The average time span was almost 33 years at the turn of the century and has declined 
to 3.4 years for innovations in 1967-86. Empirical evidence suggests this change 
resulted largely from a lower of absolute cost advantages of first movers through 
easier transfer of knowledge and skills across firms and was also facilitated by the 
growth of markets (2001: 161). 
 
Time span, as we are witnessing in business practices today, has become a crucial element to 
gaining traction in first mover advantage. Improvements in digital and mass media 
connection have fomented an incredible online consumer networks. In this postmodern, 
information-age epoch, change seems to occur within some industries at a faster, accelerated 
pace. For example, within a period of five years, from 2003-2008, three different firms 
dominated the social networking industry: Friendster, Myspace and Facebook. 
 
They began as US based networks that quickly became International, where they 
competed with Orkut, Hi5, Fotolog, and a litany of others. Friendster pioneered a unique site 
for people to connect with their friends. Myspace emphasized originality through users being 
able to design their own profile, uploaded pictures in a multitude of locations on the profile, 
and allow users, recoding artists, and music companies to share music, either through non- 
transferrable MP3 files or videos. And Facebook created at first an Ivy-League and 
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University focused network, but updated a real-time forum to interact with friends through 
instant-messaging capabilities while using a controlled, monochromatic profile page to 
comment on pictures and member´s updated status. These innovations firmly placed 
Facebook in the lead. Facebook is now linked to thousands of applications and intensive data-
work linked advertising technologies, that place brands literally in front of the consumer, 
making choices in consumer preference determined, especially as this growing 
access to internet technology has at the time fragmented and diversified markets. Businesses 
have become savvy in their ways to connect with consumers. 
 
The process of learning in consumer preference formation has been studied as related to 
first mover advantage, arguing that the ways in which consumers learn about brands is a 
salient factor in market dominance, even when buyer switching costs are minimal and the 
brand can be repositioned (Carpenter and Nakamoto 1989, 1990). When consumer 
knowledge of the product is low, first movers get the chance to create the logics through 
which consumers envision the products and its subsequent values and attributes. This clears 
the way for marketing practices that convince the target audience of the benefits of this 
product, a much tougher job for later entrants. This way of becoming a “prototype” in the 
market, the standard through which the others are judged, allows the first mover to define 
whole product categories (Alpert 1987; Howard 1989). The very nature of consuming 
products requires decision-making processes that lend themselves to preferences, and this is a 
learned experience. Original brands become the ideal through which later entrants are 
negatively compared. The pioneering brand then carries competitive inroads by being 
competitively “distinct.” Consumer judgment and decision-making studies confirm this 
argument (Tverksy 1977: Houston, Sherman and Baker 1989). 
 
Called the “head start effect” by research that looks at response time by later entrants 
(Brown and Lattin 1992), this head start is shown by classic studies to create additional 
conditional advantages, such as consumer awareness leading to product trial and eventual 
repurchase, should the trial be a positive experience, minimizing information costs and 
consumer perceived risk (Schmalensee 1982). Hoch and Deighton (1986) have demonstrated, 
moreover, consumer’s reluctance to switching brands to later entrants once a positive 
consumer experience has been branded with a first on the market. Recently, Agarwal and 
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Gort have recalled these arguments, adding the important emphasis of consumer perceptions 
to risk, and highlighting the role of uncertainty over time, a theme we will soon turn to. They 
note: 
 
In models developed by Schmalensee, uncertainty about product quality and differences 
in consumer experience with the competing brands leads to inequality in consumer 
acceptance between incumbent firms and later entrants, thereby leading to entry barriers. 
(2001:163) 
 
While the associated advantages of being first clearly lend themselves to various competitive 
advantages, as outlined by the behavioral and economic studies on first movers, this does not 
mean that later entrants are necessarily duped of all agency in the market. What this implies, 
though, is that the later entrants, without the assumed advantages of being first, must work 
more heartily on strategy. Empirical evidence, using brand models and PIMS systems, has 
shown the various conditions through which first movers and later entrants have competed 
over market profits (Agarwal and Gort: 2001; Carpenter, Krishnamurthi, and Shankar: 1998; 
Kalyanaram, Robinson, and Urban: 1995). In some cases, studies have shown that of 50 
product categories, only 4 pioneer first movers hold highest market share (Golder and Tellis 
1993). 
 
 
As was mentioned earlier, the pioneer, however, plays a central role in defining the 
category concept (ex. Kleenex), as well as buyer preferences for the category (Carpenter and 
Nakomoto 1989). The pioneer and later entrants in a category then compete over these 
preferences (Carpenter and Nakamoto 1996). These earlier studies confirming first mover 
advantage led to studies suggesting “that late movers should identify superior positions and 
outspend pioneers to beat them at their own game” (Carpenter, Krishnamurthi, and Shankar 
1998: 55). 
 
 
The recent Global Financial Crisis provides insights about how banks competed for 
clients and profits in this way. Past research on first mover advantage highlighted Merrill 
Lynch’s introduction of CMA, cash management accounts, and how this novel introduction 
allowed Merrill Lynch to become number one in the U.S. securities brokerage sector in the 
1970´s.  This first mover advantage lasted maybe thirty years. 
 
 
Positivist reasoning might argue the introduction of online trading over the past 
thirteen years significantly reduced the profit margin for U.S. securities brokerage houses. 
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And these extremely low commission fees reduced the competitive advantage of Merrill 
Lynch among retail brokerage clients, at least among retail clients, since perhaps low prices 
became more important to consumers than the ability to offer a plethora of investment 
services at a much higher price commission rate. However, the mass-market appeal of 
online commission rates did not bring about Merrill Lynch’s near demise in late 2008.  The 
financial crisis and Merrill Lynch’s significant exposure to leveraged corporate loans and 
sub-prime mortgages were the defining factors in the company being taken offer by Bank 
of America. 
 
Merrill Lynch’s significant non-interest income, albeit at a lower growth rate than the 
 
1980´s and 1990´s, arguably would have been particularly lucrative to any financial 
institution. The reasoning is that a collapse in interest income for banks during the financial 
crisis made non-interest income so much more important to stabilize loan losses. Therefore, if 
Merrill Lynch just kept doing what it was great at, the company could acquire a large bank 
during the financial crisis. Instead, Merrill Lynch’s adaption during the last decade into a 
much more Goldman Sachs style model of trading for its account proved unwise. Merrill 
Lynch did not perform an adequate job of managing risk as its cross-town rival, Goldman 
Sachs. Thus, Merrill Lynch lost its independence as an independent concern and crippled the 
value of the firm for its employees and shareholders. Goldman Sachs may very well have 
benefited from Merrill Lynch’s loss.  (Merrill Lynch will be discussed further on at the end of 
this section). 
 
Since the product, and its market, has been largely dictated by the pioneer, later entrants 
can profit from this a priori knowledge. As Carpenter, Krishnamurthi, and Shankar assert in 
their important analysis of late movers: “By understanding these preferences, a late mover 
can identify a superior but overlooked product position, undercut the pioneer on prices, or 
out-advertise or out-distribute the pioneer, thereby beating the pioneer at its own game” 
(1998: 54). In other words, the work of the first mover, and their mistakes, can benefit late 
movers who may have perhaps witnessed the pitfalls of prior product positioning gone 
wrong.  Later entrants, however, carry the burden of pioneering the strategies through which 
to outwit their competitors. 
 
Competitive advantage, and its sustainability is an “intra-industry” issue (Porter 
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1985:11). I provided an example, earlier, of these competitive advantages in the case of the 
Apple IPhone and other smartphones.  To beat their pioneering competitors, firms must 
innovate a product, service or idea. This research has suggested looking at empirical evidence, 
studies that modeled brand performance (through diffusion), affirming the importance of 
innovation to the success of later entrants. Carpenter, Krishnamurthi, and Shankar (1998) warn 
that studies have not adequately examined “the impact of innovative late entry on either the 
diffusion process or the responsiveness of the brands’ sales to marketing expenditures. That 
may suggest mechanisms of advantage for innovative late movers” (1998: 55). Using a 
generalized Bass model (1969) for brand diffusion and impact, Carpenter et al. 1998 raise 
questions about sequential ordering and marketing expenditures by looking 
at diffusion of innovative versus non-innovative brands. They ask: 
 
 
Does innovative later entry led to faster diffusion, greater potential markets and 
higher repeat purchases compared with other entry strategies? Does the diffusion of 
an innovative late mover slow the pioneer’s diffusion or reduce its marketing 
spending effectively in a way that noninnovative late movers do no? (1998:55) 
 
After complex modeling and analysis, they demonstrate that innovative late movers diffuse 
more rapidly, garner higher market potential and repeat rates compared to both pioneers and 
non-innovative late movers. They argue, furthermore, that innovation allows late movers to 
impact a pioneer’s diffusion and market. Non-innovative late movers, on the other hand, 
underperform as compared to their peers. Moreover, the results indicate that the non-
innovative late movers also have less effective marketing spending along with lower repeat 
purchases, while pioneers – who maintain higher potential markets - remain unaffected by 
their diffusion and marketing mix effectiveness. 
 
Being innovative, however, involves strategic spending on marketing and other kinds 
of risk taking that reflect market uncertainties. What kinds of things must one consider when 
they make the business decision to enter a new market? Research has conceived and 
evaluated several models that look at the behavior of agents entering a new market. They use 
experimental market paradigms that test for risk-taking while entering a new market, vis-à- 
vis self-skill assessment, as well as of the other competitor’s skills as variables that shift 
entry. Testing for overconfidence, Camerer and Lovallo (1999), found higher entry rates 
when ranked on the basis of tests as opposed to random ranking. In a similar study, Moore 
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and Cain (2007) examined the difficulty of the test in the construction of overconfidence, as 
higher entries into the market came from easier tests.  Karaila and Hogarth (2010) have 
shown that if uncertainty enters the game, low profiled firms have higher entry rates than 
without uncertainty, and that high profile firms remain unaffected. Lippman and Rumelt 
(1982) have used the term “uncertain imitability” in this regard, as it is informed by the 
ambivalence and lack of concrete reasons for first mover success.  This research shows the 
relevance of assessing knowledge about competitors’ skills as integral to deciding whether to 
enter a market, and under varying conditions of uncertainty.   How can firms expand or 
innovate in the face of uncertainty? 
 
Before discussing uncertainty in the subsequent section, it is important to encapsulate 
first mover advantage in the context of this thesis.  Pioneering companies that achieve first 
mover status do so because they have a receptive customer base.  As a result, researchers 
should carefully differentiate between what is in a firm’s control (its operating ability) and 
what is somewhat outside a firm’s control (the final reception from customers).  For example, 
some product categories resonate with international consumers.  Dell, Apple and Facebook 
reinforce this resonation.  Other product categories, such as Merill Lynch’s wealth 
management business, have succeeded much more domestically than internationally when 
compared to the firm’s investment banking business.  This paper has highlighted what firms 
can do to achieve first mover status, what first mover advantage means both theoretically and 
empirically, and the concept of innovation with respect to becoming pioneering.  The strategy 
literature within this thesis largely focuses on traditional competitive environments viewing 
the consumer as homo-economicus and disregarding cases that resemble outliers or that 
require further explanation.  While such a positivist stance is crucial for making arguments 
between first movers and consumers, uncertainty is more complicated.  Thus, this thesis will 
examine the gap in the literature to better understand uncertainty.                
 
 The next section  will survey literature on uncertainty and risk and also discuss how 
cross-communication difficulties, as captured by Hofstede’s “Uncertainty Avoidance” can be 
a site for analyzing human business practices that consider more than the enduring vision of 
the rational homo-economicus.  This survey of the literature on uncertainty and risk is meant 
to demonstrate the ways that these concepts and their limits, can help to inform the relevant 
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assessment of skepticism, as a useful paradigm for understanding the decision-making 
processes.  
Part 3: From Risk and Uncertainty to Skepticism in Business Practices 
5.1 Uncertainty 
 
Uncertainty and risk has been framed in various disciplines and practices from physics 
and meteorology to finance and psychology. Given this range, it has become a complicated 
term that takes on many significations depending on the disciplinary context and use. Risk is a 
term found in old Greek to be rizikon, or root. It was later used in Latin as “cliff.” In Arabic, 
rizk, perhaps its truest contemporary meaning is translated as “to seek prosperity.” Sociologist 
Niklas Luhmann (1996) looks at the use of this term in the early modern period in Europe.  In 
various dialects, rischio or reizgo was picked up through Middle-Eastern and North African 
Arab Traders who used the term in connection with legal loss and damage in activities such as 
Sea Trade.  
 
Hence, even that far back, risk was conceived on terms of likely loss and 
magnitude. 
Today it many technical applications are consistent with this older use. Risk is assed 
as first: possibility, which is binary (either it isn’t possible 0%, or it is possible 100%) and 
then probability, the probable magnitude and probable frequency of loss. In more practical 
applications like decision theory, which is a bit like game theory, the probability is either 
normative or prescriptive, and uncertainties are assessed in relation to choice. Even the 
‘paradox of choice’ has been addressed, which suggests that some agents perform worse when 
faced with too many outcome choices (Schwartz 2004). ‘Expected opportunity loss,’ the 
chance of the loss multiplied by the amount of loss’ is often used to assess risk in insurance. 
Rarely are these negotiations risk neutral. And as such, these models have become important, 
as correct prediction of loss is tantamount to the sustainability of contemporary businesses. 
 
In the tradition of Ethics and Philosophy, Uncertainty measures the relationship of 
truth and knowing to existence. The diagram on the following page demonstrates just some 
of the ways the term is used and applied broadly. 
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Chart 3 
 
 
Diagram 1. Taxonomy of Uncertainty
 
Source:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Uncertainty.svg 
 
 
 
As seen even in this taxonomy above, Uncertainty branches out into different typologies of 
decision-making. There is the binary of the object and subject.  This objective route leads one 
to seek knowledge through epistemological uncertainty.  Episteme is about ‘knowing,’ while 
ontology is about ‘being,’ therefore ontological uncertainty is quasi rational in that it cannot 
be denied, there is sort of ‘fact-ness’ to ontology.  On the other end of the pole is the 
subjective way of knowing oneself. In subjective uncertainty, contestations over Moral and 
Rules are outlined.  I do not wish to have us venture too abstract, however, in our concern for 
uncertainty.  But I want to emphasize the difficulty in terminology that gets applied broadly, 
as these can be quite esoteric concepts.  Good empirical research must define its own terms, 
and for the purpose of this research, my emphasis on historical narratives necessitates a 
review of the common uses of these terms. 
 
Many studies in business research have sought clarity on uncertainty from seminal 
explorations in Economics.  In his 1921 classic treatise, “Risk, Uncertainty and Profit,” 
University of Chicago Economist Frank Knight made a critical distinction between Risk and 
Uncertainty.  He asserted that while risk was ‘measurable’ to some calculative degree, 
Uncertainty is that which is immeasurable. He declares: 
 
“Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of 
risk, from which it has never been properly separated.... The essential fact is that 'risk' 
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means in some cases a quantity susceptible of measurement, while at other times it is 
something distinctly not of this character; and there are far-reaching and crucial 
differences in the bearings of the phenomena depending on which of the two is really 
present and operating.... It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or 'risk' proper, as 
we shall use the term, is so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in 
effect an uncertainty at all.” 
 
His analysis emphasizes the lack of quantifiable probabilities attributed to Uncertainty, 
whereas Risk involves specific probabilities for an outcome. 
 
 
Others scholars have insisted on measuring, or trying to calculate, intangibles in 
business practices.  This is a critical and subtle distinction from Knightian Uncertainty, which 
asserts that uncertainty is that which is immeasurable.  Some researchers have also made the 
focus of their studies the quantifiable search for the very intangibles that were framed as 
impossible to calculate.  Doug Hubbard, in a 2007 publication, outlined the following 
framework and definitions for these terms, providing a refreshing reading of risk and 
uncertainty: 
 
1. Uncertainty: The lack of certainty, A state of having limited knowledge 
where it is impossible to exactly describe existing state or future outcome, 
 more than one possible outcome. 
2. Measurement of Uncertainty: A set of possible states or outcomes where 
probabilities are assigned to each possible state or outcome – this also 
includes the application of a probability density function to continuous 
variables 
3. Risk: A state of uncertainty where some possible outcomes have an undesired 
effect or significant loss. 
4. Measurement of Risk: A set of measured uncertainties where some possible 
outcomes are losses, and the magnitudes of those losses – this also includes 
loss functions over continuous variables. 
 
 
In this text, Hubbard renders ‘a softer side’ to measuring uncertainties that give researchers 
new tools and ways to synthesize data.  This point of departure from Knightian uncertainty 
attempts to place the human back into the positivist and analytical process of measurement, 
showing how varying contexts require different understandings of measurement and yield 
various kinds of results.  Hubbard urges that instead of ignoring something we know as 
intangible, we should try nevertheless to measure it in the most precise way.  Without 
understanding the reliability of the data, research cannot be made useful. The more important 
a value, the more likely it is to be measured inaccurately.  Thus, he rescues basic 
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misunderstandings of measurements, providing critical insights for business and management 
today.  
5.2 Consumer Uncertainty 
 
Uncertainty as a construct for describing consumer behavior can be tilted towards the 
conceptualization of uncertainty as “not knowing”, as Knight emphasizes, towards an 
unquantifiable probability.  But given this lack of measurement within this “not knowing”, 
“immeasurable” construct for uncertainty, how can unquantifiability provide improved 
understanding and insight for consumer behavior for first movers and pioneers? Is not 
unquantifiability comparable to researchers tossing their hands up in the air as a struggle for 
finding an explanation?  Or is this unquantifiability directed towards the consumer with 
regards to their consumer behavior?  Since opportunity benefits for products are normally 
quantifiable, do unquantifiable aspects uncertainty provide value for marketers and 
researchers?  Epistemological uncertainty, which represents the most applicable construct 
from ethics and philosophy, and relates well to uncertainty as constructed Hubbard. 
With a knowledge-based uncertainty that is quantifiable and measurable, but still distinctly 
separate from risk, there is a construct for uncertainty that can be utilized to analyze 
consumer behavior.  Using the confines of literature from first mover advantage and 
pioneering advantage, this quantifiable and measurable construct for uncertainty pertains to 
consumers’ concerns about product quality from new entrants.  The research within FMA 
strongly supports this concept of uncertainty about product quality from market pioneers 
through the head-start effect and the process of learning in consumer preference formation, in 
which first movers have a multitude of conditional advantages.  These conditional advantages 
for first movers exist because consumers have already engaged in product trials and repeat 
purchases, leading to the consumer’s repeated brand loyalty.  Therefore, market pioneers are 
at a disadvantage because it is much more difficult for pioneers to enlist the consumer in 
product trials that led to repeat purchases, as the consumer is already tied down to another 
company.  The essence of FMA is that consumer needs are already being met and pioneers 
are disadvantaged.  
   
Quantifiable and measureable uncertainty for pioneers should test high when 
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knowledge for the product (or product category) is low and high when knowledge for the 
product (or product category) is low.  As a construct, quantifiable uncertainty with regards to 
product quality should remain an important amplifier for describing consumer behavior with 
regards to pioneering firms, brands and product categories, but it provides the greatest insight 
when knowledge about the product or product category is higher.  As a result, this 
knowledge-based uncertainty construct is very interesting. 
 
Other business and strategy scholars have moved being the limits of uncertainty as 
an analytical impossibility and used it to describe business models and values cross-
culturally. Perhaps one of the most notable of these paradigms, Geert Hofstede’s classic 
(1980) research proposed four basic cultural factors to be considered in communication and 
cross cultural competence.  In his paradigm, Hosftede framed four cultural values that vary 
by country: Uncertainty Avoidance, which refers to a society’s tolerance for uncertainty and 
ambiguity; Power Distance, a culture’s ability to wrestle with hierarchy and inequality, 
especially less powerful units like the family; Masculinity, refers to assertiveness and the 
distribution of roles between the genders; Individualism, the degree to which individuals are 
integrated in groups, the opposite of collectivism.
4  
See Norway’s graph next. He has since 
 
updated his earlier work after interest in Chinese research on truth and time. This new 
category, Long-Term Orientation, are the values associated with longer-term like thrift and 
perseverance in opposition to values associated with short-term orientation, which are respect 
for tradition, for filling social obligation and protecting the ones that ‘face.’ These are based, 
in large part, on the teachings of Confucius. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 http://www.geert-hofstede.com/ Accessed November 30 2011 
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Chart 4 
 
 
 
Geert Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions - Norway. 
http://www.geert-hofstede.com/ 
 
We can judge from Hofstede’s model above, two very striking differences in 
Norwegian (and Scandinavian) culture that are far from common throughout the globe: a 
rather low Masculinity (which in this context refers to a high degree of gender equality and 
lack of assertiveness) and a fairly reasonable sense of Power Distance. This might speak for 
many Social Democracies but the link to gender makes this graph quite accurate, even in its 
comprehensive generalizations. Norway’s Uncertainty Avoidance, moreover, is moderately 
elevated (though not quite as high as Nordic Individualism). This indicates a modest amount 
of uncertainty, and as history has shown, the country works hard to keep things in civil order. 
According to Barr and Glyn (2004), Hofstede’s factors “refer to those specific values and 
beliefs that demonstrate less variation among individuals within a nation than among 
individuals across nations.” This emphasis on measuring horizontally, instead of vertically 
throughout his research, makes many generalizations possible while still creating models that 
can be easily applied and, at the very least, marketable. More and more, international 
businessmen are turning to Hofstede’s models to seek answers about cultural difference.   He 
has even made available these dimensions as technology on the ever-popular iPhone. By 
purchasing one simple application, clients (consumers, businessmen, and officials) can now 
‘navigate through cultural difference’ with the tip of your fingers! 
 
 
But what can these models really help us to understand about culture and skepticism? 
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For example, his value Uncertainty Avoidance, ultimately refers to man’s search for truth.  It 
tries to understand how culture is programmed to deal with unstructured situations. Cultures 
that have high uncertainty avoidance ratings minimize uncertainty by employing strict rules 
and laws, safety and security measures, working towards the belief that truth is expressed 
through science, rational enlightenment, or religion.  Their generality can be helpful 
understanding a cross-cultural analysis of how countries manage civil society.  They, 
however, conflate important group distinctions about identity and the plurality evident within 
nations, for a dominant view of a culture. This generalization across and not within culture, 
as Barr and Glynn (2004) suggest, is strategically useful for comprehensive comparative 
work. Skepticism in Norway might be another dimension like Hofstede’s UAI, that by its 
virtue of generalization, also has room for error. Skepticism can be seen as a cultural value in 
Norway, that at various moments encounters models of uncertainty and risk, the affirmation 
that “not knowing” is more advantageous than facing “the truth about truth.”  The 
methodology of using uncertainty avoidance to predict outcomes for consumer behavior with 
regards to specific product categories does have a precedent within academic literature. 
 
Delorme (2009) states:  
 
“Diehl et al. (2007) measured uncertainty avoidance to test the hypothesis that 
American consumers would be less skeptical of pharmaceutical advertising than would 
German consumers.  Uncertainty was conceptualized as the extent to which people 
strive to avoid ambiguity by relying on established norms, rituals and practices and 
was measured using Hofstede´s Uncertainity Avoidance Index.  The researcher´s 
predicted that the Americans would score lower on uncertainty avoidance than would 
the Germans and be less skeptical.  The results supported this hypothesis----the 
American consumers were less skeptical of advertising in general and toward 
advertising for both Rx and OTC drugs than were the German consumers.” (2009:57)  
 
Diehl et al. utilized the United States’s lower uncertainty avoidance scale rate 
compared to German’s higher uncertainty avoidance to test for consumer skepticism towards 
pharmaceutical products.  Delorme and Diehl seem to indicate there is a potential correlation 
between uncertainty avoidance per Hofstede´s cultural dimension scale and consumer 
skepticism within that society.  But does uncertainty avoidance and skepticism have a 
correlation?  If so, is the correlation positive or negative?  And how does skepticism differ 
from uncertainty?    
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5.3 Skepticism 
 
The current and past research on skepticism in business in Norway is quite thin, if 
almost nonexistent. Keyword searches in the main databases (such as EBSCO) for skepticism 
and business yielded limited citations. They can be summed up as three broad bodies of 
research: 1) marketing and strategy articles that deal with consumer skepticism of advertising 
such as tobacco marketing (Aarø and Braverman 2004), 2) audience reception studies, and 3) 
research that looks at the relationship between cultural competence with a focus on 
uncertainty and risk when entering a market. This latter body of literature formed the bulk of 
this section, showing us the relevant connection between modes of accessing risk and 
uncertainty, their role in first mover or entry accounts, and the ways that consumer or cultural 
value form a part of this process. Skepticism is particularly useful, because it is an embodied 
uncertainty that has the potential to halt decision-making processes. It is a novel way to think 
through how companies today encounter contingencies that affect the way they make 
decisions, speculations, as well as the kind of information they base those decisions on.  
These terms, as will be discussed, also get framed as cross-cultural values through skepticism 
that can be explored via Geert Hofstede’s use of Uncertainty Avoidance. 
 
The first category of research on skepticism frames consumer behavior models using 
the common understanding of skepticism, as seen in studies that test marketing and consumer 
response. They focus on combining market research with decision-making and business 
modeling, looking at skepticism from lens of consumer behavior. Audience Reception 
Studies are slightly different, looking at the ways consumers identify with the mass 
communication or advertising directly. This research tends to look at the relationship 
between the meaning intended by the producer of the media and the subsequent way the 
“receiver” of the media perceives meaning. These kinds of studies, using encoding and 
decoding (semiotic analysis to assess the transmission of meaning) focus on the ways 
meanings change in the communication process (Hall 1976), which has been helpful to 
communications and business marketing. Of course, these studies also cite how mass 
communication maintains a sense of naturalness to the society’s way of organizing 
consumers. This tends to reveal how societies maintain status quo, dominant behaviors, and 
social habits, including the kinds of inequalities that are generated through the increasingly 
mass-mediated world. Media reception studies have dealt with the concept as skepticism 
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through the idea of consumer resistance, but do not go beyond that. 
 
Focusing on the third approach to skepticism, the literature fruitful for helping to think 
through the issues at stake in this thesis are empirical studies that use behavior tests, modeling 
and evidence to think about uncertainty and risk. They range in understanding and application 
of the terms uncertainty and risk. Some, as we have discussed, look at border-to- entry 
models, the affect of overconfidence and order-of-entry on the decision-making process 
involved in risk-taking (Camerer and Lovallo 1999 and Hogarth and Karalaia 2010). But 
these assessments fall short of thinking about skepticism overtly - which is complex. Some 
studies have opted – instead – for the notion of ‘overconfidence,’ which is modeled 
‘positively’ in their tests, obscuring the poles of real human decision-making behavior. This 
positive notion of overconfidence can be thought of as a polar opposite of more negative 
notions of skepticism. We do not always make ‘positive’ decisions, so it is important to think 
about a concept that can be induced through reasoning, not merely deductive logics found in 
much of these models. 
 In 2003, the skepticism discourse took a significant leap forward.  Morel and Pruyn 
introduced a revolutionary paper into literature, which intended to “introduce the concept of 
consumer skepticism toward new products (CSTNP) as a more comprehensive notion of 
consumer skepticism than skepticism toward advertising” (203:351-358).  Morel and Pryun 
emphasized the importance of their work by commenting: 
“Strikingly, practically all the studies carried out thus far are characterized by an 
exclusive focus on consumer skepticism toward (some form of) advertising. Investigated 
objects of consumer skepticism are seals of approval information in advertising (Beltramini 
and Stafford 1993), environmental claims in marketing communications (Mohr et al. 1998), 
to what degree consumers believe/disbelieve advertising claims (Koslow 2000, Koslow and 
Beltramini 2002), skepticism toward TV advertising (Boush, Friestad, and Rose 1994), brand 
familiarity and invoice price effects (Hardesty, Carlson and Bearden 2002), how the effect of 
advertising differs across cultures (Feick & Gierl 1996), consumer skepticism toward cause 
related marketing campaigns (Brønn and Vrioni 2000) and advertising in general (Mangleburg 
and Bristol 1998, Obermiller and Spangenberg 1998, 2000). 
 
As a result, Morel and Pruyn opined: 
“Research into consumer skepticism has suffered from the lack of a clear and consistent 
definition of consumer skepticism.  Reported studies are largely incomparable and have 
hardly contributed to coherent and progressing theorizing, due to the use of different 
definitions” (2003:351-358).  
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This confused rhetoric within the skepticism discourse is accordance with the belief of 
the author of this paper. Then in 2007, Tan and Tan introduced what was perhaps the most 
revolutionary model for skepticism within advertising literature. Tan and Tan (2007) 
expanded an initial framework developed by Obermiller and Spangenberg (1998), suggesting 
that personality traits and consumer experiences were the two main antecedents to consumer 
skepticism.  Unlike Obermiller and Spagengenberg´s historical paper, they choose to 
substitute self-esteem with consumer self-confidence, as a sub-category of an antecedent 
within personality traits.  Tan and Tan (2007) believed Bearden et al. (2001)´s and Thomas 
and Oliver (1999)´s work on consumer self-confidence indicated that consumer self-
confidence was a more relevant measure than competing measures such as a Rosenberg´s 
self-esteem scale, Wright´ s (1975) information processing confidence measure and Bagozzi 
and Heatherton´s (1994) state self-esteem scale (p. 62).  Therefore, they identified four 
primary antecedents to skepticism: age, education, cynicism and consumer self-confidence 
(which can be seen in Chart 5 below).      
 
Chart 5 
 
  Adapted framework for skepticism toward health  claims (Tan & Tan 2007) 
 
The building blocks for this model date back to Wright in 1975, illustrating how 
skepticism has a taken a long time to expand within business literature.  Perhaps the 
reasoning why skepticism has been ignored within strategy literature is a direct result of 
being able to accurately define and identify skepticism. Such reasoning could also explain 
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why uncertainty is largely preferred as a reason for explaining consumer inertia towards 
pioneering firms, products or product categories. This model by Tan and Tan provides a 
much needed apparatus for there to be a constructive discourse into skepticism.  Perhaps the 
most appropriate way of engaging this upcoming discourse is to discuss the antecedents used 
for testing for consumer skepticism.    
Age and education represent two clear quantifiable antecedents for researchers to use 
to construct models that test for skepticism.  At the same point in time, perhaps age and 
specific experience with regards to the target of skepticism being measured could be more 
helpful.  For example, if a researcher is testing for consumer skepticism with regards to 
financial products, a wealthy fisherman could have more experience with financial products 
than a medical doctor who has always kept his financial assets in the bank as cash.  While 
education is perhaps easier method for classifying participants in a research study, the object 
under investigation for skepticism might receive more reliable data from research if 
experience is used as an antecedent for skepticism as opposed to education  
Cynicism represents a very unique antecedent for skepticism, since it is distinctly 
different than risk, i.e. loss, and uncertainty, which can be understood in their applied context 
as measureable or immeasurable risk, quantifiable or unquantifiable loss, or uncertainty with 
regards to product quality.  According to the American Heritage Dictionary, cynicism is 
partially defined as a 1) “An attitude of scornful or jaded negativity, especially a generate 
distrust of the integrity of professed motives of others” and 2) “A scornfully or jadedly 
negative comment or act”.   Such a definition has the potential to amplify consumer behavior 
because the root of “scornful” and “jaded” in both definitions demonstrates potential 
alterative motives.  The alterative motive could be a result of the cynic questioning the 
motivations of others or the cynics themselves having alterative motives since nomenclature 
of “scornful, “jaded” could relate to troublesome personal life history that has had an effect 
on their life course and interaction with others.  This antecedent of skepticism is interesting 
because it can include elements of personal life course, family background, and can even 
reference culture, allowing additional factors to amplify consumer behavior as opposed to 
only risk and uncertainty. 
The final antecedent of skepticism according to Tan & Tan, consumer self-confidence, 
is intriguing because it reinforces this human, personal, and cultural element mentioned 
above.  While consumer self-confidence is distinctly different than consumer self-esteem 
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according to Tan and Tan, the conceptualization that people’s view either of themselves or of 
their own confidence level can influence their tendencies towards skepticism is helpful to 
understanding the role of individual on consumer behavior and decision-marking.   
Could low self-esteem or low self-confidence led to above average “scornful” or 
“jaded” acts and comments with regards to brands, firms and product categories without 
discernable justification?  Could high self-esteem or high self-confidence led to less average 
“scornful” or “jaded” acts and comments?  Does this dialectic relationship between cynicism 
and self-confidence or self-esteem influence perception with regards to market pioneers and 
first movers?  There are many questions that arise from the amplification of consumer 
behavior with the use of skepticism as an analytical tool and provide further insight into 
consumer’s decision making.      
Morel and Pruyn identified six antecedents as factors leading to skepticism: cynicism, 
trait skepticism, consumer sentiment to marketing, age, product interest, and product 
familiarity.  They believed hypotheses from predominate literature on the subject indicated 
that higher cynicism, higher trait skepticism (predisposition to skepticism) and higher age 
would lead to higher amounts of consumer skepticism towards new products (CSTNP).  
Additionally, they also felt the hypotheses also indicated that higher consumer sentiment to 
marketing, higher product interest and higher product familiarity would lead to lower 
CSTNP.  As a result, higher CSTNP scores would lead to more negative product judgment 
and lower purchase intention. 
Once again, cynicism and age are expressed as antecedents to skepticism.  However, 
Morel and Pruyn discuss four additional antecedents when juxtaposed with Tan & Tans’ 
article. Morel and Pruyn mention product interest and product familiarity as two of the four 
additional antecedents, which seems largely intuitive. The product familiarity antecedent 
appears closely associated with knowledge-based uncertainty, meaning uncertainty with 
regards to the product quality since CSTNP relates to new products.  This similarity also 
highlights perhaps a close dialectic relationship between uncertainty and skepticism, which is 
in accordance with Delorme and Diehl et al. The product interest antecedent could be argued 
as being closely related to product familiarity, but the distinction between product familiarity 
and product interest could provide greater flexibility for describing consumer behavior than 
knowledge-based uncertainty in research studies.  The final two antecedents for skepticism 
are trait skepticism and consumer sentiment to marketing.   
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Trait skepticism and consumer sentiment to marketing can be regarded as perhaps 
correlated.  Trait skepticism indicates a pre-disposition to skepticism based on an 
individual’s life course.  Obviously multiple outcomes can increase trait skepticism, such as 
parent’s marriage status, past relationship experiences with friends or lovers, history of drug 
and alcohol abuse individually or in close proximity to the consumer, current financial 
situation, and other personal variables that might not normally be addressed in a classic 
research design for consumer behavior.  This inclusion of trait skepticism as an additional 
antecedent to skepticism amplifies skepticism for exploring consumer behavior because it is 
willing to accept the specific personal developments that make individuals actually human 
and affects these consumers’ life course.  Clearly, crisis events within the life course can 
profoundly alter human psychological conditions and lead to perhaps irrational behavior.  
Are not at least some physical or mental aliments generally accompanied by significant pain?  
Could not significant mental or physical pain, either prior or current, lead to skeptical 
tendencies symbolized by duplicity, lack of clear intention, misinformation and mistrust?  
For example, would a consumer really tell a marketer or producer of a product that they were 
raped as a child and have difficulty accepting messages from authority figures or males as a 
result of that experience. 
With regards to consumer sentiment to marketing, marketing researchers are obviously 
aware that some consumers are more palatable to marketing in general than others.  While 
this development should not be considered an entirely novel contribution to understanding 
consumer marketing, it is this ability to synthesize skepticism’s other antecedents that allows 
for consumer sentiment to marketing to be explored further and amplified. Consumers are no 
longer isolated but incorporated into the consumer behavior via their extensive life course.  
For example, it has been stated that high cynicism and high trait skepticism leads to high 
CSTNP.  Could high rates of cynicism and high trait skepticism also be negatively correlated 
to positive consumer sentiment to market?  Could the background information contained in 
the classification categories for the antecedents provide both qualitative and quantitative 
enhancers? 
It is important to understand that skepticism is an interdisciplinary discourse and could 
help amplify consumer behavior.  But more importantly, CSTNP is isolated to performing 
only one specific function, which is analyzing consumer response to new products.  Such an 
inclusion of skepticism and its respective antecedents could be an important complement to 
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risk and uncertainty with respect to brands or products, because the fluidity of the skepticism 
discourse has obviously allowed for multiple and varying antecedents.  This potential for 
permitting new antecedents into the skepticism discourse and thereby understanding the 
consumer’s life course within the context of consumer behavior perhaps allows for more 
detailed case studies with respect to market pioneers.   
 While the antecedents of skepticism have been diagnosed, perhaps a clear definition 
for skepticism would be appropriate in being able to further understand the benefits and 
weakness of the skepticism discourse.  Morel and Pruyn define consumer skepticism toward 
new products as following: 
“A consumer’s tendency to question any aspect of a new product offering, in any form 
it may appear (e.g. facts, inferences, or claims). This questioning tendency is a context-
induced state and will be stronger for skeptical people (being part of their skeptical nature). 
CSTNP is biased towards disbelieving, but this bias may be overcome if the evidence is 
convincing. In other words, consumer skepticism is pre-attitudinal and it can, theoretically, 
be decomposed to the level of attributes of the new product (consumers may question any 
aspect of a product offering).” (p. 351-358).   
Additionally, Obermiller and Spanenberg define ad skepticism as “the tendency 
toward disbelief in advertising claims” (1998:312).  Both definitions provide potency.  
Merriam Webster’s dictionary defines disbelief as “the act of disbelieving: mental rejection 
of something as untrue”, suggesting a finality in the consumer decision-making process 
which is incapable of being overturned.  In the former definition, as “tendency to question 
any aspect”, there is room for more variation, asymmetries and grading for researchers due to 
the semantic differentiation between “questioning” and “mental rejecting.”  However, since 
the skepticism discourse is meant to help assist researchers, marketers and companies as a 
way of understanding consumer behavior and is biased towards the consumer disbelieving, 
perhaps describing the skepticism discourse as a “methodology to measure disbelief of 
claims” is most accurate. 
The strength in the skepticism discourse is the flexibility antecedents, which is meant 
to amplify the human life course and provide more color and detail than merely risk and 
uncertainty.  Clearly, firms with first mover advantage have more trust with both their 
customers and prospective customers than latter entrants.  It is this conceptualization of trust 
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and knowing which provides the long-term relationship between the established player and 
the consumer, thwarting new entrants from the opportunity to establish test trials since their 
needs are already being met.  Therefore, new entrants could easily be treated with mistrust 
and disbelief, since their claims are highly tested by consumers.   
According to Obermiller and Spagenberg (2000:312): 
 “There is compelling evidence and argument that consumer socialization occurs in the 
family (Moschis 1985).  Parents influence children through modeling, explicit instructions 
and controlled experiences (Ward, Wackman, and Wartella 1987).  The evidence therefore 
suggests that skepticism toward advertising is likely modeled by the parents and maybe a 
salient manifestation of consumer socialization in the family.  Skeptical parents should 
produce skeptical children”.  
This research provides fodder for the argument that skepticism both unique and can 
influence cultural factors.  If skepticism transcends generations in a household, cannot 
skepticism transcend generations outside the household? Delorme and Diehl et al. argue for a 
cultural model for skepticism, by linking uncertainty avoidance (from Hofstede) with 
skepticism.  Feick and Gierl (1996) also found support of cultural differences about 
skepticism towards advertising when they compared East and West German consumers, so 
there are precedents for viewing skepticism culturally.  While some literature focuses on 
skepticism being rooted in behavior, with self-confidence, cynicism and consumer sentiment 
as antecedents, cultural skepticism can be explored.  
 
Skepticism, moreover, can be a useful tool through which to think about corporate and 
consumer behavior, as well as the inextricably linked factor in these markets like media, 
politics, and economies. Perhaps this is not at all surprising; that a notion whose original 
meaning reminds us how little we know – where the management of “knowing” is a top 
concern – demonstrates the need to confront such a term. Socrates’ famed adage: “all I know 
is that I know nothing,” is one of the first textual declarations of the skeptical sensibility. This 
philosophical insight spawned a way of thinking where followers in ancient Greece, led by 
Pyrro, believed that no real knowledge or truth could be certain. 
 
Thus spawned a term to capture those whose only certainty is ‘not knowing,’ which as 
will be demonstrated later, is fundamentally distinct from uncertainty. Outside of this 
36 
 
distinctly ancient and philosophical rendering of skepticism lies its everyday quotidian use. It 
generally denotes a modality of questioning based on the inability “to know” and therefore 
signals mistrust or disbelief. The Oxford Dictionary defines skepticism as “a skeptical 
attitude; doubt as to the truth of something.” When the truth is about speculations and 
 
business, the ability to not know can be seen as a form of uncertainty or risk. Deciding how 
much to wager in business strategies is often a balancing act, as well will see in the historical 
accounts of skepticism in the following section. 
 
I will now turn to history, in the next section, as a counterpoint and way of thinking 
through cultural business and communication patterns and values over time. These case 
studies, where time becomes a measure for analytical reasoning on these earlier topics, help 
us also to think about how firms are very much like humans that evolve, shift form, migrate 
and as corporations, – are also humans - forced to act within institutional and practical 
forces, like law and policy, and opinion and skepticism. 
Part 4: Historical Moments in Business Skepticism: The Case of Norway 
6.1 Business and Norway  
 
This section will look to the histories of firms in Norway as case studies for 
skepticism.  Recounting narratives about corporations demonstrates that, despite the various 
speculative models economists may generate about the behavior of firms, markets and 
consumers, the evidence often shows precisely how these models fail to account for real life 
instances in business history. These corporate, governmental, infrastructural and commodity 
accounts show how Norway shifted structures particular concerns, ranging from earlier 
nationalism and domestic market protectionism to later permutations of conscious 
consumption and sustainability.  This humanization afforded by the skepticism discourse is 
meant to reveal more than uncertainty and risk, because the amplification of skepticism via 
antecedents allow organizational and cultural decision marking to be explored beyond 
traditional business terminology.  The ability to amplify is the hallmark of the skepticism 
discourse. 
 
Studies in business history, beyond market and strategy research, look at the historical 
37 
 
accounts of corporations for supplementing our knowledge of how businesses sustain 
themselves today. Recently, Harvard Business Professors Khanna and Jones, have argued for 
the need to amplify history as an analytical model (2006). They parallel, for example, the 
historical and organizational structures of empire, and relate it to business models, such as 
time variance. They argue that some firm patterns have appeared, then disappeared, often 
reappearing again later under distinct conditions. Their analysis looks at the enduring path 
dependency and offers Penrosian resources as an alternative. Their concluding remarks 
remind us that work is to be done in the long-durée of business analysis: “suggest that re- 
embracing history in the mainstream is not tantamount to sacrificing methodological rigor” 
(37). This thesis seeks to build from this insight by looking to case studies of skepticism 
historically. These narratives recount how skepticism manifested itself through a 
combination of variables, (some ostensibly measurable) that have the potential to inform how 
we think about concepts like first mover, order of entry, pioneering, uncertainty and risk, 
skepticism and innovation. 
 
For example, Evan Lange’s, Crossing the Borders: Studies in Norwegian Business 
History, published in 1994, shows how businesses were networks that drew from many 
resources – a combination of technology, management and strategy - for successes and 
failures. Drawing from case studies in this text, I outline historical moments of skepticism 
that demonstrate the complexity for regarding uncertainty and risk under measured 
circumstances. 
6.2  Borregaard:  from First Mover to Failing Innovations 
 
 
A/S Borregaard could be considered one of Norway’s definitive first movers, at least 
through the 1960s.  It then a witnessed subsequent downward spiral in market share, and after 
some 100 years of timber dominance in Norway, was bought up by 1986 Orkla Industries. 
What might have caused this firm, once so prominent, such a grand fall? 
 
Beginning as the Kellner-Partington Paper Pulp Company Ltd, for almost a century 
the firm dominated the Norwegian timber market, therefore playing a fundamental role in the 
country’s emerging industrial development. Founded by the British businessman Edward 
Partington in 1889, it soon had subsidiaries beyond England, in Sweden, Austria and 
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Norway. The Norwegian division, Borregaard Fabrikker of Sarpsborg, from its onset in 1892, 
assumed the firms most productive and integral unit. The plant produced a third of all 
chemical pulp in Norway, employing the nation’s largest work force, with over 2000 
employers by 1909 (p. 21). By the end of 1917, the company passed into Norwegian hands 
officially, securing a foremost place in Europe’s wood processing industry. 
 
After the Second World War, it expanded to include operations in textile and 
chemical sectors, processing organic and inorganic cellulose based synthetic fibers and other 
chemicals. During that epoch, the company competed for top role in Norway’s industry with 
electro-chemical company Norsk Hydro, buying up Denofa-Lilleborg and Folldal Verk by 
the end of the 1950s. By 1962, Borregaard had become the country’s first real industrial 
conglomerate, with over 13,000 employees, in plants strewn throughout Norway, along with 
sizable pulp factories, timber holdings and power stations in Sweden and Austria. 
 
From the apogee of Borregaard’s success in the 1960s, however the firm faced a 
tragic decline. The loss of competitive advantage began as mere stagnation, but indecision in 
the 1960s and 1970s ultimately led to the firm´s failure to innovate accordingly, resulting in 
an eventual demise. Orkla Industrier bought up the majority of Borregaard’s shares in 1986. 
As Lange shows in his analysis of Borregaard, the firm’s success and failure can be 
understood through understanding three key concepts like management, strategy and 
technology. Throughout these years, the firm faced only four administrations, making it a 
good case study for understanding these processes. 
 
Beginning with the pioneering British industrialist, Edward Partington, under an 
agreement with German-Austrian Dr. Karl Kellner, a known cellulose expert, the Kellner- 
Partington Paper Co. Ltd. began as an already technologically innovative venture. Both men 
held patents on sulphite processes and turned over the rights to this knowledge over to the 
company. Their vision was to sell these technologies and monetize these patents by 
expanding into factories across the European continent and North America. The process was 
equally strategic: produce semi-finished materials from Norwegian timber, which then got 
shipped off places, such as the UK, for this final processing of paper. By setting up factories 
outside England, which had the strongest market for Borregaard´s products, freight costs 
could be saved and access to high quality raw materials still secured. 
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The pulp factory in Sarpsborg, conferred by decisions made in Manchester, was 
spearhead by Oscar Pederson, one of Norway’s foremost experts on sulphite pulp. Pedersen 
had until then worked for Norway’s oldest pulp plant, Halfslund Chemiske Træmassefabrik. 
His brother Nils, trained under him, made for a Norwegian managerial team comprised of 
highly technical skill coupled with an extensive administrative background. Between 
Partington’s technical expertise (coupled with a penchant for great entrepreneurial leadership 
in commercial ventures) and Oscar Pederson’s skilled management and foresight for 
technological and productive efficiency, Borregaard’s profit margins were above the industry 
average from the beginning due to this human merger of competencies. 
 
Much of the profits could be attributed to economies of scale, given the heightened 
level of technological efficiency, strategic modes of production process, along with the 
mobilization of Kellner- Partington’s marketing and stature, through already quality hungry 
markets. Not reducing quality through economies of scale, moreover, might have been the 
hotbed for its subsequent success. The drive for technological innovation as seen through the 
development of the firms bleaching process, which involved research and experimentations in 
production process, also contributed to this apparent success. Often forgotten from this story 
of Norway’s premier wood processing company was that it was a product of a global 
economy and thus international market strategies and other important decisions were handled 
with devotion, decisiveness and great detail. 
 
In 1917, a consortium of banks and timber owners placed the company under 
Norwegian ownership. Until his death in 1933, Hjalmar Wessel headed this new national 
version of Borregaard. Under his leadership, he generated global niche markets for fine paper 
along with pushing successful ventures in rayon (artificial silk) making Borregaard a world 
leader in this regard. Arne Meidall, his incumbent, hummed the successful firm along, while 
also expanding product spectrum to make use of all possible by-products, along with the 
acquisition of Denofa and Lilleborg Fabriker, who processed fat and detergent, from 
Unilever Trust. Under these leaders, and a favorable post-war economy, this one timber 
processor had transformed into an expanding industrial conglomerate by 1960s. Along with 
Norsk Hydro, Borregaard was a hallmark of Norwegian business. 
 
Apparently as it became a huge conglomerate, however, this industrial giant got 
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sleepy. There were moments in this process that proved critical to maintaining its success or 
that led up to its fall. But profits had begun to fall in the 1950s, and the technological savvy 
Borregaard had secured in the sulphite industry waned and innovations lulled. Under the 
helm of Rein Henriksen, who was an insider and a capable Director, Borregaard continued 
along. This grand corporation shifted management modalities, however, and while Henriksen 
was made managing director, he now also had to contend with another chairman of the 
board. This difficulty to locate defining leadership and power made Borregaard less active 
and flexible, as Henriksen was a man of calm and calculation. This likely made decisions 
pertaining to Borregaard amorphous and harder to define. It was at this time that the firm 
faced contestations over strategies on how to proceed. 
 
In the 50s the strategy had been to diversify their market, and in the 60s they sought to 
focus solely on wood processing. This was Henriksen’s initial intention; to bolster the firm’s 
original focus on wood processing, maintaining a first mover status in one market first, and 
cementing profits that way first. The board, however, felt that wood processing had a limited 
life span, and that other ventures must be investigated. The solution eventually settled on, 
would be that wood processing would be a natural activity for Borregaard. They would remain 
centered on wood processing, having been decidedly skeptical to other possibilities. 
Borregaard focused on two projects in the 60s that defined their role to come in the 70s and 
80s. 
 
 
Over time, these projects proved unsuccessful. Had the newsprint project proposed by 
 
Henriksen been realized, it might have salvaged Borregaard from demise. But due to 
passivity from the board about technological investments in mechanical wood pulp from 
Norwegian spruce, the project sat idly. They also lacked the necessary investors and needed 
authorities to guarantee high debenture loans. Moreover, the board’s interest turned to 
processing wood from Brazil, soon becoming Borregaard’s primary focus. 
 
The possibility of high profits from cheaper raw materials, a shift from spruce (which 
in Norway was becoming increasingly expensive) to fast-growing Brazilian trees convinced 
the boards of a quick fix to their wood processing potential. In November of 1965, after 
Borregaard officials made several business trips to Africa and South America, they settled on 
a project in southern Brazil. With the help of the Brazilian Development Bank they overcame 
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initial resistance and skepticism, for there were many worries about the risks involved in this 
kind of overseas investment, especially political risk, as the cold war moment was also a time 
of political tension. To keep the pulp plant in Sarpsborg alive, a bleaching process was added 
and partial production occurred in Brazil, a cooking and pre-hydrolysis process, before 
getting shipped off to Norway. 
 
 
This project enjoyed the financial advantage of cheaper wood and “the world’s long 
pulp factory” (Lange 1994: 40). This proved to be a pioneering task, indeed, and the 
management was proudly moving forward into uncharted waters and new territories. In 
Guaiaba, Rio Grande do Sul, a pulp factory, name the Industria de Cellulose Borregaard 
opened in 1972. The Brazilian Development Bank, despite being under a country’s military 
regime, was made the largest shareholder but without full voting rights. Guaranteeing the 
majority of shares in Norwegian hands, DnC, A/S Borgestad and Christiania Bank supported 
the majority of stock. Overall, the project was commercially and technologically successful, 
and efficiency marked by the lower costs of transport and production despite the distance. 
 
Cultural and political problems from oversea expansion eventually loomed, like 
contestations over contract and profit shares (including expectations from Brazilian politicians 
over “commissions”). The Brazilians were forced to absorb initial negative loss, and felt 
profits to be unfairly accumulating. The specific debate boiled down to the price of 
unbleached pulp. Borregaard managed to get out of Brazil without a net loss, but not without 
a substantial setback in time and energy. 
 
The lack of flexibility exemplified by Borregaard’s inability to both diversify and 
focus on simultaneous projects, led to their demise. The firm’s management failed on several 
occasions to agree on visions, inhibiting the firm from ‘jumping on possible bandwagons’ or 
diving into projects. They became ‘sleepy, giant’ and skeptical. The newsprint project might 
have proved fruitful, but had evaporated in the vigor to manage the plant in Brazil. Borregaard 
encountered the 1970’s significantly weakened and skeptical of new areas, like Oil. Although 
they ventured into vinyl acetate, replacing sulphite ethanol as a raw material, they essentially 
dropped the ball on the growing petro-chemical industry, and failed to collaborate efficiently 
with Hydro on a grand-scale petro-plant that involved an ethylene cracker. What little they did 
do for Hydro and Norske Esso in connection with the oil refinery in Slagen, was from a sense 
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of national duty and cooperation in the North Seas Gas (Lange 1994: 45). Apparently, amidst 
the distraction in Brazil, the board was generally skeptical about the oil business, and 
prospecting, fearing the uncertainty and risks associated with the new industry. Especially 
after the risks endured in Brazil. 
 
In these critical moments, we witnessed Borregaard outshined by national wood 
processing competitors, like Follum and Nordenfjeldske, whose newsprint operations proved 
strategic in terms of access to the forest industry. Furthermore, Hydro’s positioning and bold 
investments in the Oil industry propelled this firm and Norway into a new level, leaving 
Borregaard to flounder, eventually bought up by Orkla in 1986. 
6.3  Electrifying Exports: Norwegian Hydropower 
 
 
 
By 2030, Norway hopes to be carbon neutral. The country plans to reach this goal 
through a combination of tax exemption for eco-friendly vehicles, increased taxes on fuels 
like petrol and diesel and rising use of renewable energy, like Hydropower. 99% of Norway’s 
Hydropower is a renewable and sustainable energy. This kind of sustainability, along with 
technological innovations has made Norway’s access to hydropower an increasingly 
domestic commodity with potential for expanding markets across national borders. In the 
 
1990s, with the approval of the Energy Bill, the Nordic market liberalized. With the 
accompanying integration of the market and the establishment of the Nord Pool, it became a 
part of the wholesale electricity market.
5
 
 
The electricity market in Norway has come a long way. Before this liberalization in 
the last twenty years, the market began locally and regionally in Norway, and only the state- 
owned power producer, Statkraft, monopolized foreign sales. In the early 1900s, when 
Denmark expressed interest in Norway’s hydropower, government official met the idea of 
exporting hydropower and electricity in general with profound skepticism. What can explain 
this enduring skepticism over the export of hydropower? 
 
                                                          
5
 http://www.nordicenergysolutions.org/performance-policy/nordic-cooperation/the-development-on-the- 
nordic-electricity-market  accessed November 30 2011 
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Historically, foreign interest in Norway’s hydropower began with the rise and scarcity 
of coal and fossil fuels used throughout Europe. These factors were further complicated by 
the shifting conditions and economic concerns during and after the WW1. According to Lars 
Thue, early attempts to export power failed “due to a lack of correspondence between 
demand and supply: Foreign demand for Norwegian power was prompted by the same 
factors that created Norway’s opposition or unwillingness to export” (Thue 1994:52). Given 
foreign countries interest during tougher times, Norway maintained a skeptical position about 
exporting. By 1917, electricity was prohibited for sale outside of Norway without the 
countries approval.  
 
In 1919, when the Danes approached Norway for power due to scarcity of coal and 
rising prices of fuel, a commission was set up in Norway to evaluate the possibilities of 
electrical export. Officials from Denmark, Norway and Sweden constituted this commission. 
Before work could even be completed, the recession in 1920 made prices fall, and “hard times 
made it difficult to finance a power transmission project” (Thue 1994). Ironically, it was 
precisely due to this very recession that Norway began to consider the possibilities of 
profiting from this resource. Both Norway and Denmark’s interests were, given the timing, 
out of sync. 
 
The post-1905 economic boom in Norway allowed the Liberal Party to lobby for 
electrification as a benefit to social welfare and an important national resource. Many viewed 
exporting this kind of resource as a threat to Norway’s domestic power supply, and worried 
about the lack of labor and time to build new power plants. Fearing they might set up 
contracts that would oust themselves from valued waterfalls and hydropower in years to 
come, they opted during this historical period for regulation and “national self-sufficiency” 
(Thue 1994: 52). Like many other countries during the First World War, Norway desperately 
needed power, and it was agreed that its power must come before its export. 
 
The recession in 1920, however, gave way to new needs. With the Conservatives in 
power, the market became more liberal and restrictions decreased, and they sought to return 
to the possibility of export to Denmark. As Thue explains: “it became more difficult to sell 
the output generated by many power plants, a fact which tended to undermine the arguments 
against exporting power. But, as we have seen, Norway’s change of heart came too late. The 
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Danes were no longer interested in Norwegian Power” (1994: 53). Despite conversations 
about power export by the League of Nations in 1920, in addition to the establishment of 
“The Nordic Association” in 1919 - which Norway used to try to sway the Danes - the idea 
of power export meandered. 
 
At the World Power Conference in hosted in Berlin on 1930, Norway was pitched as 
the “powerhouse of Central Europe.” Norwegian hydropower professionals presented a plan 
for transmitting wattage to Germany. Another consortium, dominated by the state-controlled 
German power company, Elektrowerke Aktiengesellschaft, formed to address these issues. 
Export plans subsided when Germany faced economic shifts in 1930, but the German Reich 
and the occupation of Norway changed the very tenor of these concerns. The 
Reichkommissar in Norway, Joseph Terboven, hoped to dominate energy policy, and 
appointed himself chairman of an organization founded under the occupation in 1940. The 
Arbeitsgenmeinschaft für den Elektrizitätsausbau Norwegens’ ambitious goal, to be the 
supreme energy producing enterprise, fell short. The utility companies and electrical 
engineering industries failed to be swayed by short term transmission sources, and although 
Germany invested quite a bit on building power-intensive industries near Norway’s power 
sources, due to logistical failures, along with allied bombing and other difficulties of war, few 
of these goals and facilities transpired. 
 
After the Second World War, the Danes expressed interest in Norwegian hydropower. 
The Labor Party spearheaded into modernization projects through economic policies that 
allowed private consortiums to become state directorates. Lars Evensen, the Ministry of 
Industry, hoping to promote industrialization, formed The Norwegian Water Resources and 
Energy Administration (NVE). Their goal was to build up power intensive industry geared at 
manufacturing exports. 
 
In 1947, the new Labor Party placed Fredrik Vogt in charge, handpicked by the 
Minister of Industry for his academic expertise and leadership skills. Prior to exile from the 
Nazi Regime, Vogt had been a reputable hydropower engineer and served as Dean of the 
Norwegian Institute of Technology, in addition to chairing the Mechanics Department since 
1931. He was skeptical regarding the consortium’s discussions about power export to 
Denmark. During the war Norway had experienced electric scarcity, and he felt it more 
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prudent to support power through commodities like carbides, aluminum, minerals, alloys and 
steel. The Danes reacted to this resistance by emphasizing their disappointment in the years 
their consortium had invested under false hope. Norwegian skepticism was perceived as 
obstinacy by Denmark. Vogt then embarked on negotiations with Denmark in the name of 
good neighborly relations, hoping they could discover themselves the difficulties of 
hydropower export (Thue 1994: 58). 
 
It was at that time, historically, that contestations over European and International 
trade policies entered the limelight. Within this context, the “Nordic countries were the site 
of virtually non-stop communication on economic cooperation” (Thue 1994:58). With the 
influence of the American’s Marshall Plan, which promoted liberalization, Europeans were 
increasingly mobilizing as an economic unity. The Norwegians faced pressures to 
compromise, especially as dollars became more and more necessary, and gaining Marshall 
dollars would help financial circumstances. Vogt played hardball with Danish engineers 
about prices of power, effectively engaging in a kind of skepticism that was also a kind of 
‘risk’ to negotiation. These moments of skepticism remind us how uncertainty avoidance may, 
in its own way, be seen as risky to the impending need to continue along in a “business- as-
usual” manner for business to actually continue. As this “punic war” over power export was 
being waged, the Prime Minister Hans Hedtoff’s Social Democratic government was 
overthrown. Due to these clashing of circumstances all previous negotiations, that had taken 
place in 1948-49, became futile. As Thue states “had anyone but Vogt been leading 
Norway’s negotiations with Denmark, a contract may have been signed afterall” (1994: 60). 
 
 
It was then that Norway’s Minister of Trade, Erik Brofoss, began to work around Vogt 
to negotiate power transmission to Sweden and Denmark, also hoping to solicit World Bank 
Loans for this purpose, along with allied financing. He was a fairly new and popular actor in 
Norwegian politics that gained prestige through dual degrees in Law and Economics, and a 
leading role in reforming the Labor Party’s economic policy. In 1953, given the pressures to 
decrease Norway’s deficit and solicits aid and investment, Brofoss courted Sweden with a 
development project in Sør-Trøndelag County to supply power to the city of 
Stockholm and Trondheim from Norwegian waterfalls.
6
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The Electrical Utilities Board in Trondheim had applied for a license to regulate the 
Nea watercourse, and this came upon the charge of Vogt. He and the NVE council voted 
against the proposition, and the state in turn continued to maneuver against his accord. 
Norway’s Minister of Trade was really eager to put something on the table that would 
increase Nordic cooperation. Hence, what emerged was really a debate between two players 
in politics with different ideologies. Whereas Vogt was interested in securing industry that 
required power within the Norwegian domestic space, Brofoss was arguing for the need for 
Nordic “cooperation” to enhance domestic revenues and access to international loans and 
reputation. 
Vogt then made a public statement about his role as an arbiter of policies that may, by 
nature of its role as council, work against the interest of state. In an annual National 
Economics Association conference in 1954, Vogt expressed a firm criticism against the 
proposal that had been presented in Stockholm. He did, however, indicate that if power 
absolutely must be exported, Norway’s “natural market” would be Jutland area of Denmark 
and northern Germany (Thue 1994: 63). In this speech, he acknowledged that cheap 
Norwegian hydropower was one of the domestic industries’ few advantages in an 
international marketplace. Giving away this industrial advantage would ‘border on suicide.’ 
Vogt, ever the quintessential skeptic, continued to emphasize that Norway should export 
power in “the frozen form” (Thue 1994: 62). 
 
It was than that Vogt received a letter from Brofoss highlighting his intentions in the 
matter. He explained the need to consider energy exports “the fundamental structural 
problem in Norway.” The need to formulate and accumulate capital in Norway was 
coinciding with trends in foreign policy that entailed regional alliances and consolidations in 
the name of defense. As Thue puts it best: “Brofoss’s problem was that the country had too 
little capital, while Vogt was worried about Norwegian industry having too little power” 
(1994: 64). 
 
These both logical and competing reasons for managing Hydropower export 
differently were a testament to the various kinds of uncertainties different markets 
encountered depending on economic and political climate. There could not have been an 
algorithmic formula to a figure this debate out.  The government went on with the Nea 
Water projects arranging 15 years of power export. Only time would tell that Vogt would 
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eventually see that more detailed negotiations and logistical contracts led to more protection 
of Norwegian interests. In 1963, after four successful negotiations with Sweden, Vogt even 
commented on how the Swedes had been so ‘overwhelmingly favorable to Norway.’ This 
cooperation, much to his chagrin, worked out quite well, and based the idea of surplus power. 
It balanced out ‘good power’ years with ‘bad power’ years handing only a percentage of 
what Norway did not need. 
 
 
Lars Evansen, the Minister of Industry in charge of Fredrick Vogt during his tenure 
even remarked once in hindsight: “I may not have been enough of a tactician…we 
shouldhave called it energy cooperation, not energy export. (Thue 1994: 66).  The move to 
‘cooperation’ instead of simply ‘power export’ proved to be a successful shift in rhetoric 
and strategy. The export of “firm power” became the new language for power export. Over 
the course of the next 30 years, Norway successfully ‘cooperated’ with Sweden and later 
Denmark on hydropower. But not without a healthy dose of Norwegian skepticism for 
years from Vogt. 
 
In the 1990s, the state’s energy monopoly, Statkraft, signed an agreement with 
Denm0ark’s ELSAM. The emergence of surplus capacity made these exports easier because 
prices could be kept low and not sold as firm power on long-term contracts - that made for 
better profit. Because of this there emerged a new discussion about exporting power. Power- 
intensive industry feared losing the advantage inherent to local cheap power. Energy 
producers, however, argued that this would be profitable and “create new jobs, be 
environmentally safe, and would earn significant revenues” (Thue 1994: 67). 
 
Indeed, environmental concerns and policy has become, in this era, a new site for 
debates over whether to export firm power or not. To replace pollution by giving other 
countries sustainable energy, instead of their use of exhausting thermal energy, is one reason 
to favor export. Creating power intensive, but also green eco-industry, has become another 
reason to want to keep it in Norwegian hands. The need for favorable returns, however, 
prompted the Energy Act passed in 1991 that opened up a competitive market for electricity 
producers on the national level. 
 
The prospects for Norwegian hydropower have proved positive today despite the past 
concerns and skepticism that exporting firm power, even if proven to be surplus capacity, 
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might ‘contaminate’ domestic prices. Since initial costs have finally been invested, 
transmission centers and pipelines included, the future costs continue minimal and 
advantageous, in contrast to the initial enduring skepticism about the uncertainties and risk of 
self-sufficiency long held by the NVE and Vogt. Moreover, sustainable energies like 
hydropower have become even more valued in a market that moves toward ‘conscious’ 
consumption. 
Part 5: Analysis, Synthesis and Conclusion 
7.1 Analysis 
 
This section will briefly analyze both the Borregaard and Hydro-Power cases.  Defining 
skepticism as a “methodology to measure disbelief of claims”, skeptical claims and the 
antecedents of skepticism will be identified and addressed.  Skepticism allows us to 
understand both “what” is being disbelieved and “why” the disbelief exists.  Empirical 
questions can be raised from the summary.  But first things first, let me begin with an analysis 
of the Borregaard and Norwegian hydropower case and follow up with a synthesis. 
   
In the first case study, the board of directors at Borregaard indicate “a disbelief of 
claims” that expanding outside the firm’s core focus of wood processing is beneficial to the 
company.  The claim is obvious, because Borregaard’s board of directors experienced 
unsuccessful innovation and diversification in the 1950’s and decided to resume a "back to the 
basics” business approach.  The antecedents for skepticism expressed by Morel & Pruyn   
(cynicism, trait skepticism, age, product interest (wood processing) and product familiarity 
(wood processing) could be measured on an individual and aggregate level for the board, 
testing for the degree of skepticism among the board of directors.   Some antecedents will test 
higher than others (If the board of directors were capable of being interviewed).  However, the 
background behind the antecedents is what differentiates skepticism from other discourses like 
uncertainty; the individual’s life course influences the levels of the specific antecedents 
measured and thereby the outcome of decision making processes. 
 
Could Borregaard´s management believed any indication that its core business faced 
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bleak prospect have negatively impacted its credit agreements with Norway´s leading banks? 
Could Borregard´s executive management believed if they were wrong about the prospects in 
the energy industry or other industries and expanded into these industries that such a route 
could create significant reputational risk for themselves and family? (With an emphasis on the 
family´s reputation in this country of less than four million people at the time.)  Or could 
radically diversifying make the board of directors at Borregaard appear unstable given the 
firm’s longevity in the industry and its decades of past success in the aggregate?  As an 
anecdote, the commodification of wood processing over the last fifty years would have made 
the able managers seem inadequate given the intense competitive pressure in the industry, but 
a such concern merely explains the outcome as opposed to explaining the decision making 
process involved in the specific case.   
 
The concerns of poor experience (with prior diversification efforts), financial risk (to 
Borregard’s financial earnings or relationship to the banks), personal reputational risk (the 
reputation risk the directors’ families), and business reputational risk (the director’s own 
business reputation) are all plausible explanations for being cynical and thwarting the 
diversification efforts.  More importantly, financial risk, personal reputational risk and 
business reputation risk all represent different types of risk that deal with some specific loss, 
so the link between risk and uncertainty is unmistakable.  But the skepticism discourse 
amplifies understanding to improve clarity. The difference between classifying these concerns 
solely as risk and loss aversion as opposed to skepticism needs to be explored.  Risk is 
supposed to be quantifiable.  For example, insurance companies assess probability and assign 
premiums based on their probability ratios.  Such risk is clear and definable, articulated 
explicitly.  Uncertainty is dynamic and can be quantifiable or unquantifiable.  Skepticism is 
amplifiable.  
 
  In the second case study on exporting hydroelectric power, the Norwegian government 
officials express disbelief in the positive exportation of Norway’s hydro-electric power.  The 
Norwegian parties involved in the case should be measured for cynicism, trait skepticism, age, 
product interest (hydroelectric power exports) and product familiarity (hydroelectric power), 
with different antecedents having different readings.  The explanation for the antecedents and 
the skepticism is multi-faceted.  One explanation could be nationalism, which relates to 
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ontological uncertainty; Norway could view its self-sufficiency in power generation as vital to 
its national interest.  Additional amplified explanations for skepticism could be Norway’s past 
scarcity of electricity during the War (risk) and the country not wanting to be legally 
committed to selling electricity in case scarcity were to develop again (risk).  Once again, the 
link between risk, uncertainty and skepticism is clearly present but skepticism provides a more 
abundant methodology for explaining the decision making process.   
 
A second level of explanation can be expanded upon.  During the time period of this 
case study, most laborers worked in manufacturing or farming, as the service sector was only 
beginning to blossom as a new industry class. Therefore, Norway could have perceived itself 
as a significant manufacturing power before the discovery of oil in the North Sea.  As a result 
of the country’s manufacturing capabilities, could the country have believed it needed some 
type of competitive advantage over Denmark, Germany and other nations, with cheap power 
perhaps serving as a main competitive advantage (measureable/quantifiable uncertainty)?   
Such a statement is important, because it includes Norwegian culture and Norwegian history 
into the discourse by clearly acknowledging the influence that culture and history has on the 
antecedents for skepticism.  Perhaps Norway wished to maintain autonomy after experiencing 
almost five hundred years of rule under Sweden, Denmark or Germany.  As a result, 
skepticism towards outsiders increased justifiably.   
 
In Chart 6 below, it is discernable that the Norwegian government has significant 
ownership in many of Norway's most predominate companies.  Statoil, Telenor, Norsk Hydro, 
Yara and DnB NOR represent Norway’s five largest companies and all possess significant 
government ownership. While ownership stakes in public companies by governments globally 
is somewhat common, particularly within Europe and Asia, this ownership strongly suggests a 
desire to protect industry and create national champions through government involvement.  If 
a firm is controlled so tightly domestically, then all the large decisions, with regard to business 
development, employees, and profits remain within the nation as opposed to outside its control 
via foreign ownership.   Additionally, this ownership stake allows for a protective relationship 
to flow between the entity and national government, in which mutual support can be offered in 
either direction.  For example, Telenor had a significant business dispute with its Russian joint 
venture partner during the last several years.  Therefore, Norwegian ownership in Telenor 
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allowed the resolution from the dispute to be handled diplomatically as opposed to a laissez-
faire.  
 
Chart 6 
 
 Source: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Propositions-and-reports/Reports-
to-the-Storting/2008-2009/report-no-10-2008-2009-to-the-storting/2.html?id=565917 
 
Both case studies in their entirety can be summed with two alternative explanations 
respectively: concern of the opinion of others in the former case and nationalism in the latter 
case study.  Are these explanations culturally derived?  Clearly, Norwegian enterprises will 
respond differently to situations than say, Chinese enterprises.  But do homogenous countries 
have nationalistic responses to specific settings or outcomes?  Obviously, responses are 
subject to the specific matter discussed.   With respect to protectionism, for example, both 
China and Norway protect domestic industry from foreign competition, but each nation does 
so with a different methodology or culturally unique method.  China prefers joint-ventures 
between domestic enterprises and non-domestic companies so that its emerging economy can 
gain knowledge transfer.  Norway, which is already an advanced, industrialized nation, prefers 
foreign capital indirectly via the stock exchange in its larger companies, some of which are 
listed on the previous page, and in which Norwegian management runs the operations.   
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Therefore, there are culturally constructed solutions depending on the objective and need (i.e. 
China needs skills and Norway desires foreign capital so it can have a developed, international 
capital market system). 
 
Since this paper explored first mover advantage and pioneering advantage, a more 
relevant question might ask, how do Norwegian consumers respond to the new product 
development of international companies, either companies which are first movers or market 
pioneers?  Because this paper is partially interested in the effect of skepticism on innovation, 
this question is relevant because it elucidates the effect that skepticism might have on the 
consumer decision making process. Since protectionism and nationalism are a possible 
explanation of skepticism in the hydropower study, is it plausible that consumer 
ethnocentrism, which is a form of consumer protectionism on the cultural level, affects the 
consumer decision making process towards the new product development of non-domestic 
firms selling into the Norwegian market? 
 
Collins English Dictionary (2009) defines ethnocentrism as a "belief in the intrinsic 
superiority of the nation, culture, or group to which one belongs, often accompanied by 
feelings of dislike for other groups," i.e. the inhabitants of an ethnocentric society believe that 
their respective culture and their nation is superior to other countries.  And Cleveland et al. 
(2009) define ethnocentrism as a concept in which people view their own national group as 
the center of the universe, meaning foreign brands can represent threats on an economic and 
cultural level.   As a result, according to Cleveland, ethnocentric consumers will make 
sacrifices choosing local brands even if the local brand is more expensive. The term 
“consumer ethnocentrism” is derived from ethnocentrism, introduced by Sumner (Shimp and 
Sharma 1987).  Originally, this concept sought to distinguish between in-groups and out-
groups (Shimp and Sharma 1987).  
 
In "Attitude toward the Purchase of Foreign Products", Nijssen et al. (1999) study the 
impact of consumer ethnocentrism in the Netherlands. Their main hypothesis is that:  
 Consumer ethnocentrism will negatively influence: 
 a) product judgment of non-domestic products, and  
b) consumer propensity to buy foreign products.  (Nijssen et al. 1999:)  
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The purpose of briefly introducing ethnocentrism is to highlight a key point.  Could risk 
and uncertainty as methodologies have unearthed ethnocentrism as a probable cause of 
consumer or institutional inertia or of the effect that ethnocentrism has in decision-making?  
Application of the skepticism discourse allows for the search for more unusual reasons within 
decision-making when compared to the traditional discourses of risk and uncertainty. This is a 
benefit of the skepticism discourse. 
7.2 Synthesis 
 
To begin with some questions, what is the impact of the human life course on the 
antecedents used in the skepticism discourse?   Does the human life course impact culture?  
What is the influence of culture on business on consumer spending and corporate decision 
making?  Does skepticism influence innovation?  Does skepticism give domestic companies 
greater opportunity than foreign firms?   Let us examine these empirical questions in reverse 
order. 
 
1) Does skepticism give domestic companies greater opportunity than foreign firms?    
 
A dialectic relationship exists between first mover advantage, pioneering advantage, 
uncertainty & risk, and skepticism.  Let us examine an explanation derived from the 
antecedents in the hydropower case study.  I can argue that ethnocentrism is a cultural 
construct that affects consumer behavior and that ethnocentrism is a by-product of skepticism. 
And if skepticism is influenced culturally as opposed to behaviorally, domestic innovation in 
culturally insular countries will suffer due to decreased competition from foreign firms.  This 
high level of uncertainty over international goods and services (via ethnocentrism/skepticism) 
leads consumers to domestic brands.  As a result, domestic first movers have greater 
opportunity to gain critical mass and maintain their head-start effect longer, since they are less 
impacted by the competitive practices of foreign firms.  This protectionism via 
ethnocentrism/skepticism allows for greater market penetration and corporate profits for 
companies in their home market because have much less international competition.  As a 
result, entry barriers created by domestic first movers can become even more intensified for 
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new entrants since the aggregate market share and profitability of these first movers is much 
higher   
 
2) Does skepticism influence innovation?   
 
It is important to understand that the skepticism discourse has led to ethnocentrism as 
an explanation for skepticism, since the skepticism discourse uses history, culture and other 
methodologies as ways of examining human responses to situations.  There is a wide held 
belief that business and culture foster innovation, as indicated by the comparative advantage of 
countries within specific industries.  But cannot one argue that skepticism as amplified through 
the skepticism discourse, can curtail innovation?  Is not skepticism a way of delaying a 
decision, thwarting a decision, or perhaps saying “no” either implicitly or explicitly?  In both 
cases, Borregaard and Exporting Hydropower, we witnessed the effect that the life course may 
have on strategic decision-making.  So I might ask, does the negative life experiences in 
people’s lives with regards to risk-taking discourage risk-taking or lower the amount of risk-
taking?  If so, could less risk-taking today lead to less innovation in the future?  The 
relationship between risk and innovation should be viewed as more of a cause and effect 
relationship, because risk is a result of moving in a specific direction and innovation is the 
success that can be achieved from moving in that new direction.   Risk and innovation would 
appear to have some element of correlation; the more meticulous calibration of risk by the risk-
taker, the greater the potential innovation at the end of the road.   With regards to Norway 
specifically, skepticism in Norway could arguably lead to either less risk-taking throughout the 
entire country or more a difficult journey for the innovators in the country who are discouraged 
from taking risk from peers, family, and so forth and so on.    
 
3) What is the influence of culture on business on consumer spending and corporate 
decision making? 
 
While more general theories serve as a background for researchers to examine 
consumer and organizational activities, this thesis has looked at Norway specifically.  The 
work of Hofstede demonstrates that culture has a profound impact on the way cultures make 
meaning, expresses themselves and the effect that cultural traits have on business practices.  
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Within Norway, the historical case studies have illustrated the Norway is confronted with many 
unique decisions.  For example, the small size of the country’s population propels many 
companies to find commercial opportunities abroad when compared to larger countries that 
possess more abundant populations to stimulate demand for goods and services.  Additionally, 
this smaller population makes Norwegian business more analogous to the “American” small-
town, wherever everyone knows everyone and decisions are more carefully deliberated given 
the lack of private space.  Such undertones can be felt in the case studies, where Brazil 
(Borregaard) is given much more preference than the domestic market or where a delayed 
decision over decades (Hydro Power) is much more culturally beneficial than a quick decision 
that is not collectively discerned or could be wrong.  
 
4) Does the human life course impact culture?   
 
Perhaps examining Norway specifically would be most helpful.  Clearly, standard 
practices in Norway such as an egalitarian secondary education, near mandatory military 
service and high minimum wage reinforce the conceptualization of culture influencing the 
individual life course.  But do individual experiences also impact culture?  For example, let’s 
say that Norwegians propensity for international travel impacted Borregarrd’s decision to 
expand into Brazil.  But could a specific executive at Borregaard have had a significant event 
in his life course in Brazil that led the firm to Brazil?  Or could this executive have had another 
event in his life course that led Borregaard to pursue business development in Brazil, such as 
difficulties in a marriage?  Since such personal information is largely off-limits to the 
uncertainty discourse, it is the skepticism discourse that extends the uncertainty discourse to 
search for reasons for consumer and institutional strategic decisions based on the human life 
course.  As a result, one could conclude that personal events might have impacted the business 
development of Borregaard, thereby influencing the culture and core make-up of the company 
by transferring human and financial capital to Brazil.  Therefore, the human life course can 
easily impact culture due to the role of high level individuals in important decision-making 
processes and the effect that these individuals have on culture at large, whether the culture is on 
a national level or even the more small microcosm have an institutional level.       
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5) What is the impact of the human life course on the antecedents used in the 
skepticism discourse?   
 
Morel and Pruyn’s six antecedents for skepticism (cynicism, trait skepticism, consumer 
sentiment to marketing, age, product interest, and product familiarity) are all influenced by the 
human life course to one degree or another.  Cynicism and trait skepticism could be socially 
constructed in the household by the parents at a young age in their offspring and have strong 
cultural underpinnings depending on the size of communities.  Consumer sentiment to 
marketing could be influenced greatly by peers, either in school or the workplace, and have a 
lasting impact indefinitely.  Product interest and product familiarity are based on life 
experience on a holistic level and could be based on risk-taking at a more micro-level, while 
age equates to a baseline of where people are in the human life course.  It is the dialectic 
relationship between the skepticism antecedents and the human life course that amplifies 
uncertainty and risk as constructs for understanding decision-making.  This paper began by 
discussing the bounded rationality of decision-making and the effects on uncertainty.  What the 
skepticism discourse attempts to amplify is that decisions should not be judged as rational or 
irrational according to classical thought on behavior economics but should be understood in the 
context of the life course.  The human life course and the effect that the human life course has 
decisions not only influence consumer response to goods, services, brands, and product 
categories but also possess implications on innovation in societies and corporate business 
development. 
7.3 Conclusion 
 
This analysis has argued the skepticism discourse is a useful methodology for 
understanding why consumers and institutions make decisions, since the application of the 
skepticism discourse allows researchers to uncover more unusual reasons regarding decision-
making as opposed to only utilizing the paradigms of uncertainty and risk.  Additionally, the 
skepticism discourse allows for various dialectic relationships to be discussed, such as those 
between risk and innovation and personal decisions influencing the culture of organizations 
when used in junction with uncertainty and risk as methodologies. 
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